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ABSTRACT
A control problem with a system modeled as a nondeterministic
finite state machine is considered. Several agents seek to optimize
the behavior of the system under a minimax criterion, with each agent
having different information about the system state. The nondetermi-
nistic model of uncertainty, combined with the minimax criterion, lead
to equivalence relations on the past input/output histories of each
agent which generate rather simple sufficient statistics for the
optimal control laws. This sheds light on the basic nature of decentra-
lized control and permits complete solution of a particular class of
problems.
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OPTIMAL DECENTRALIZED CONTROL OF
FINITE NONDETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
It is almost a cliche that computational resources are becoming
increasingly inexpensive. That this is not true of communications
resources, particularly over long distances, is a prime motivation for
the development of design methods for computationally distributed solutions
to large scale control problems [1]. The basic structure of such a problem
is that a system, subject to random influences, is to be controlled by a
group of several powerful control nodes, each of which has different
information about the events in the system due to communication constraints.
The control algorithms in each node must be designed to produce good
system behavior when they act in concert with the system.
Although problems of this nature have been considered for many years
[2,3], progress towards a general solution has been surprizingly slow.
Many problems with very special structure have been solved [4 - 9], but
problems with a more general structure have defied tractible analysis
[10,11]. Some understanding of the difficulties encountered has been gained,
but there is no class or-Problems with a aeneral, dynamic, decentralized
structure for which exact solutions can be found and used to motivate
further investigation.
The motivation for this work is to cure that deficiency. An
exceedingly simple class of decentralized control problems is posed, and
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solved completely. The simplicity stems from the assumed system model
and performance objective - a simplicity which is deliberately introduced
to illuminate the deep structure of decentralized problems, yet which
preserves the essential features of more complex applications: stochastic
dynamics, a general information structure with constrained or no communication,
and a desire to achieve performance which is optimal in some precise sense.
The system to be controlled is assumed to be described as a finite
state, nondeterministic automaton with inputs supplied by several control
agents. Each agent receives an observation at each discrete time step
which indicates a set in which the current state must lie. Each observation,
coupled with knowledge of the system structure, can lead to inferences about the
past system behavior, hence about the past observations of other agents and thus
prediction of other agents' decisions. This simultaneous interleaving
of inference by the agents, as each deduces the potential actions of
others, and the deductions of others about itself, etc. leads to some of
the complexity of the analytical process.
The notion of 'using nondeterministic, as opposed to Markov, models is
not new. They are introduced in a centralized context in [12-13], and used in
a decentralized problem in [14] . Their advantage is that the set
theoretic operations which describe their operation are extremely simple
in structure, and offer a rich opportunity for manipulation. Their dis-
advantage is that they tend to lead to "conservative" control laws, as
decisions are made to avoid highly unlikely, expensive transitions which
a classical probabilistic approach would discount.
Based on this model structure, an approach to addressing the problem
of designing the optimal (in the appropriate worst-case sense) decision
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rules has been developed. The approach is based on the identification of
the set of sufficient statistics for each agent to use and the dynamic
relations between them; these sufficient statistics are no more than the
intertwined deductions of the agents about each other truncated at the point
where they are no longer productive. The set of these statistics form an
extended state space over which dynamic programming may be used to derive
the optimal decision rules.
This approach is the major contribution of this work. It enables the
study of a class of decentralized, stochastic, dynamic, optimal control
problems which is sufficiently simple that exact solutions may be obtained.
These solutions may serve to suggest heretofore unsuspected properties
of optimal solutions in general. However, the possibility of direct
application of this approach to engineering problems does exist: many
protocols for distributed resource allocation in computer networks
(e.g. data base management or asynchronous channel access) can be formulated
in this framework (but have not yet been addressed).
In the sequel, notation and the problem formulation are introduced
in section II. The complexity introduced by just the minimax, nondetermi-
nistic optimization approach in a static, decentralized setting is discussed
in section III. The sufficient statistic, called the information relation, and
its properties are then developed and these, coupled with the results of
section III, solve the decentralized estimation problem [15] in this
context. Finally, section VII solves the control problem - and quite un-
expectedly, this involves only a rather straightforward extension of the
estimation solution.
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II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation
This work will use set valued functions
y
f:X + 2 (2.1)
to model nondeterministic behavior, i.e. y e y = f(x) indicates that any
element y of the set y C Y may arise as a result of applying f to the
point x. The extension of f to a function on the power set of X
X Y
f 2 X 2 (2.2)
-e
where
f (x) = U f(x) (2.3)
xex
will not be distinguished from f itself. Abusing notation slightly, the
preimage of y under f will be denoted by
x = f(y) = {xlyef(x)} (2.4)
Abusing notation more than slightly, f will not be distinguished from
its extension to
-1 f-l~y)f (y) f (y)
-e
yey
= xl y nf (x) -7} (2.5)
Finally, any cost functional
J : X -R (2.6)
will have an extension
J (x) = max J(x) (2.7)
e -
x e x
which will also not be distinguished from its restriction, J.
Subscripts will indicate the agent associated with each variable.
Superscripts will indicate elements of a Cartesian product set; e.g.
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t t
x = (x(l),...,x(t))e X 
B. Dynamics
The system to be controlled will have a finite state space X with
N elements and dynamics
x(t+l) e f(x(t), (t) t), u2(t)) (2.8)
ul(t) e U1 , u2(t) e U2 are inputs supplied by two decision agents (extension
to several agents is straightforward). The sets U1 and U2 will generally
be considered finite, although allowing them to be real intervals will aid
the interpretation of some examples. The state and its dynamics may be
taken to include any interagent communication mechanisms.
Observations
Yi(t) e hi(x(t)) (2.9)
are available to each agent at each time just before ui(t) is to be selected.
These may include outputs of communications channels, representing messages
introduced by other agents at earlier time steps.
The initial state is assumed fixed, known to all agents and is denoted
0
x . An imperfect initial information state can be modeled by letting
f(x ,u1,u 2 ) be independent of Ul,U2 and equal to what would otherwise be the
set of initial states.
C. Information
Each agent is assumed to have perfect recall of all past observations
and decisions. The information sequence Ii includes these via the dynamicsl
I.(0) = ( ) (2.10)
Ii(t+l) = Yi(t+l) · Ii(t)
Since each agent has perfect recall, past decisions may be formally omitted
from (2.10) as they may be recursively derived from previous observations only.
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where ( ) is the empty sequence, and * denotes concatenation. The
decision rule by which u.(t) is selected is restricted to being a causal
1
function of the local information sequence
Y.( t) Ii(t)-+ Ui (2.11)
rT represents the entire sequence of decision rules for agent i.
D. Objective
A cost function
J: XxU1 x U2 - R (2.12)
expresses the penalty incurred if a pair (u1 ,U2) are applied as input when
the system occupies state x. (Note that when J is an indicator function
on some subset of X, then the problem becomes one of maintaining x(t) in
a fixed target set in X, as treated in [14]).
' T
Taken together, the dynamics (2.8 - 2.10) and control laws r, r2
recursively define a set of possible joint state, control, and information
trajectories. Define
T T
J(r1, F2 ) = max max J(x(t),ul(t),u 2(t)) (2.13)
te{O,...,T} x(ty
ul(t)
u2 (t)
where the x(t), ul(t), u2 (t) range over all values jointly possible at
time t as determined by this recursion. The overall objective is to
T T
minimize J ( I ) (2.14)
T T
s 1, t 2
subject to (2.11).
III. THE STATIC CASE
Consider, as a start, the one-step decision case where x© gives rise
to x e f(x©), each of two agents obtains an observation Yi e h. (X), and
Y1
Y2
A. Necessary Conditions
The person-by-person-optimality (PBPO) conditions [4] are necessary
conditions which the optimal decision rules y1 and y2 for (3.1) must
satisfy. They are established as follows.
Assume y2 is known. Then (3.1) becomes
minimize max J(x,u1 y2 (y2)) (3.2)
Yl Y2
Since y1 may depend on Yl, it is sufficient to consider the values of
(x,yl,y2) in (3.2) which are consistent with each observed value of Y
* *
Y (Yl) = arg min max J(x,ul,Y2(2)) (3.3)
U1 X
Yl consistent
Y2
The values of x consistent with an observation Yl (in the sense
that both are possible simultaneously) are
x(Yl) = f(x0) n hi (Yl) (3.4)
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The x defined in (3.4) will be called the conditional state set, as it plays
the same role in nondeterministic problems as does the conditional state
probability distribution in Markov problems. The values of Y2 can also be
inferred to lie in h (x(y )), so (3.3) becomes
-2 y 1
* ^ * A
Y (yl) = arg min J(x(yl) ,ul, y2(h2 (x(y 1))) (3.5)
U1
Symmetric arguments yield
* ^ ^
y2(Y2 ) = arg min J(x(y2), 1 (hl (x(y2 ))),u 2 (3.6)
U2
and (3.5 - 3.6) are the PBPO conditions for the static problem.
These conditions have the same qualities as PBPO conditions for other
static team problems [4,7,15]. First, the decision made in response to yi
depends on an inference of the other agents' decision, hence its observation -
the so-called "second guessing" phenomenon. Second, determination of y1
for a specific value of Y1 depends on the entire structure of y2, which in
turn depends on the entire function Y1 . Thus these conditions do not
allow Y1 and Y2 to be derived on a point-by-point basis as is the case with dentra-
lized problems; a joint solution for the both complete functions must be found.
These characteristics are shared with classicaLteam problems [2,4,7]; this
helps substantiate the claim that the nondeterministic formulation is qualitative
similar to the usual Markov one.
B. Example
To help interpret the PBPO conditions, consider a specific example.
X = {1,2,3} . Agent 1 can distinguish 1 from {2,3} , and agent 2 may
distinguish 2 from {1,3} , via observations (i.e. h1l() f h1(2) = hl(3)).
Decisions are to be drawn from U1 = U = [0,1]. The cost function is:
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U2 x= 1
J(x,ul U2 ) = l1-ul x = 2 (3.7)
lu2-ull x = 3
This is sketched in Figure 1 according to conventions to be adhered to
throughout this work. States which generate the same observation to agent 1
are depicted in the same row; those with the same image under h are in the same
z-2
column.J is plotted as a function of u1 and u2 for each state.
It is immediately apparent that y1(1) and Y2 (2) are inconsequential
(where {1} = hl({l}), {2} = h2{2)). Thus Y1 is completely characterized
by Y1(2), and Y2 by 72(1).
Suppose Y1(2) = 31l Then (3.6) gives
y2(1) = argmin max {u2, lu2 - 1pl} (3.8)
A U2
(3.5) gives
Y1(2) = argmin max 1 U - u1, u 2 (3.9)
U1
These are not the usual relations encountered in optimization, but E1 = 2/3,
E2 = 1/3 can be found as- the unique solution.
This example demonstrates the character of decentralized non-
deterministic static optimization, and underscores the comments at the end of
the previous section. In general, these conditions are quite difficult to
solve computationally; it is critical to the practical solution of the dynamic
problemthat the domains of the Yi. be as small as possible.
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x=2
x=3
0
uj=r 1(2
/ / //
/ //
/ ~/ /
~~~1/ /
x=l
~1 / u 1/ 1(l)
------ &T+/:i- 
-1
0 u 2 =r 2 (1) 1 0 u 2 =r 2 (2 ) '
Figure 1: Cost and Information Pattern
C. Structure
There is some simplification possible. Begin with
Lemma 1: If x(y i) = x(y i), then Yi(Yi) = yi(Y )'
Proof: (3.5) and (3.6).
This states that the conditional state set is a sufficient statistic for
the static team problem, as is the conditional state distribution in Markov
problems [15]. However, the set theoretic nature of the problem allows
another simplification:
Lemma 2: If x(y) Cx(y ), then we may set
* A * A
Yi (Yi Yi (Yi
without additional cost.
Proof: (3.5) ana (3.6), along with the fact that
x--x ^ J(xtu 1,u 2 ) < J(x ,Ul'U2) V Ul'U 2
This has no analogy in Markov problems. It is a result of the worst
case objective, since if x is a worse case than x, in terms of set contain-
ment, then there is no harm in replacing the decision corresponding to x
A,
with that of x
There are two effects of Lemma 2. The first is beneficial - the
complexity of Y. may be reduced. The second is that for certain events,
namely, if yi is observed rather than yi, the actual cost will be greater
if the substitution is performed than if it were not. This is a result
of the fact that optimal strategies for the problem as posed may not be
unique, and that consideration of events other than the worst case may
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allow one to determine that one strategy is intuitively superior to another
even though their worst case performances are identical. The absence of
such secondary considerations are partially responsible for the conservatism
associated with minimax, nondeterministic problems; we will be sensitive to
this issue in the sequel, but not dwell on it.
D. Interpretation
The static, nondeterministic decentralized problem brings out three
points concerning more complex problems:
1. The PBPO conditions are not particularly helpful analytically.
The fact that there is a tight dependence between all points of the
decision rules suggests that the solution will remain tractable only if
the number of points for which each Y. must be specified remains small.
2. While many problems (e.g. estimation with no feedback of controls
to dynamics) may be reduced to a sequence of static problems, this usually
leads to a sufficient statistic of high dimension in decentralized settings
(e.g. sets of state trajectories [15]). In view of 1, this is not sufficiently
simple to lead to computable solutions.
3. There are available two mechanisms for reducing information sets,
and thus the complexity of Y.. Lemma 1 is the usual equivalence between
information sets based on the property of state; Lemma 2 exploits the set
theoretic structure of the problem.
The next section will introduce a construction to which both mechanisms
can apply, and develop some of its algebraic properties. Section V returns
to the decentralized estimation problem, showing how its decomposition to
a sequence of static problems can take advantage of the new structure.
Section VI achieves similar results for the general control problem.
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IV. THE INFORMATION RELATION
A. Definition
Consider the system (2.8 - 2.10). In this and the next section, we will
be concerned only with the autonomous case, where
x(t+l) e f(x(t)) (4.1)
Definition: The global conditional state set at time t, denoted x(t) C X,
is the set of all possible states which the system may occupy at time t
and which may be reached along a trajectory x which is possible given
both information sequences Il(t) and 12 (t). 
This global conditional state set is analogous to the Markov conditional
state distribution; it may be computed recursively.
Lemma 3: The global conditional state set may be computed from
x(0) = {x° )
(4.2)
x(t+l) = f(x(t))n h (y (t+l))n h (y (t+l))
Proof: Set manipulations.(4.2) first generates all x(t+l) which may arise
from states in x(t), then removes those which could not generate
the observed values of yl(t+l) and y2 (t+2).
C7
In the autonomous case, one may also generate local conditional state
sets x. (t) based on I (t) alone:
x (0) = { x }
~~~~~~A -l ~~~~~~~(4.3)
x. (t+l) = f(x (t))n h. (y.(t+l))
-1d- - - 1-i
and the various conditional state sets are related by
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Corollary: x(t) C x (t)fn x (t) (4.4)
__1
Proof: By induction. x(O) = x (O)f x (0) = {x}
_ -1 -2
If
i
x(t) C xl(t) n x2 (t) (4.5)
then -
A A A
f(x(t))C f(x (t) n x2 (t))
_-_ - -- 1 -2
(4.6)
A A
C f(x (t)) n f(x (t))
[f(x(t)) n h (y, (t+l))n ch (y2(t+') (
-1 A[f(xl(t)) n h (y (t+l))] n [f(x2 (t))n h2 (2(t+l))]
0
Note that the second containment in (4.6) may not be replaced with
equality in general; figure 2 shows an example where (4.4) must be a contain-
ment. Thus there is a more subtle relationship between local information
sequences and the global state set than that provided by the local state
sets.
Definition: An information relation R for a two agent problem is a function
from two sets Zl(t) and Z2(t) to the Dower set of another setX.
For autonomous systems, R is a primitive information relation if
t, t
Zl(t) = Y1 Z2 (t) -Y2 X is the state space, and
R(yt, yt) = x(t) a (4.8)
This definition will be extended to the case of feedback control in
section VI. For autonomous systems, the primitive information relation
contains all of the logical relationships between global state sets which
are necessary for solving decision problems.
output
YE yE
1[ {1,2} {1,2}
2 {112} {2}
state
4 {2} {2}
f(x 0 ) ={1,2,3,4}
a) Dynamics b) Observations
t y' (t) y"(t) x(t) X (t)
l l | {1,2} (i,3} (1}
2 2 2 {I ,2,3,4} {1,2,3,4} {I ,2,3}
c) Sample path
Figure 2: Example of Relation Between Conditional
State Sets
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Before developing the general properties of information relations,consider
a specific example of a primitive information relation,taken from system
(a) of figure 3. For simplicity, all examples in figure 3 will be assumed to
have an observation structure whereby agent 1 can observe the row of the diagram
which is occupied by the state, and agent 2 the column. (Thus observations
0
are deterministic functions of the state). All examples have x = 1.
0
At t = 0, I = I = (), and x = l;the information relation is as
1 2
1 1
shown in figure 4a. At time 1, Y Y = l,2} , and the
primitive relation is shown in figure 4b. Note that there is no x
consistent with observing yl( 1) = Y2(1) = 2, as only state 4 could cause
this and it cannot be reached from state 1 in one step. This is indicated
by ~ here; subsequently inconsistent cases are left blank. In every other
case, the global conditional state set is a singleton as the system is
perfectly observable globally (as is the case with all of these examples).
The information relation captures the second guessing structure - the
deductions each agent can make about others. The R depicted in figure 4b
summarizes the fact that agent 1, receiving y1 (1) = 2, knows the state
is 3 and that agent 2 observed Y2 (1) = 1. However, in this case agent 2
cannot distinguish state 1 from 3 and thus cannot determine agent l's
observation; it can conclude that if agent 1 also observed 1, agent 1 in
turn could not distinguish between states 1 and 2. This logic becomes quite
byzantine even for this simple case; the information relation captures
it succinctly.
At time 2, the primitive information relation is shown in figure 4c.
The dashed lines indicate that it is comprised of four components, each
the primitive information relation which would have resulted had the system
-16a-
column column
column column
a) Simple Reducing b) Joint Reducing
c) Infinite d) Splitting
Figure 3. Example Systems
-16b-
1 1 2
23
a) R(O) b) R(1)
1 1 2 2 t=1
1 -2 1 2 t=2
1=1 t=2 
1 !-3 _ _----_ 41 4
_ I 4 ___ _4
34i 2 3 4 ! i !,
Figure 4. Primitive Information Relations for Example (a)I IQ44 i
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0
started at the prior step in each possible state. Thus just as x = 1
expanded to R(1), so the corner of R(1) corresponding to x(l) = 1 expands
to the same structure within R(2). The information relations thus preserve
a nesting structure generated by the nesting of the observation sets (in
the sense that yi(l) is nested in (Yi(2), Yi(l))).
2
If the order of the elements of Yi are rearranged, R(2) can be
"unfolded" and rewritten as the alternate form in figure 4c. Labels for the
rows and columns, as well as impossible cases, have been dropped for clarity.
This alternate tableau form clarifies the second-guessing inference structure.
Finally, figure 4d shows R(3) as generated from the alternate represen-
tation in 4c by replacing each cell occupied by a state with the primitive
information relation generated by starting in that state. An alternate,
unfolded form is included on the right.
Figure 4d suggests the utility of the information relation. Agent 1
can receive three distinct observation sequences from which it may infer
that x(3) = 4. For one of these, agent 2 may not be able to distinguish
whether the true state is 2 or 4; for the other two, agent 2 also knows
that x = 4. In fact, the two cells at the upper right of
the tableau are completely isomorphic in their relations to the rest
of the structure, and it will be shown that the optimal decisions for
agent 1 to make in these two cases are identical. Thus agent 1 need not
distinguish between the two observation sequences leading to these two
identical rows in the tableau; the information set Y3 may be collapesed
to a smaller sufficient statistic by identifying the two cases.
Thus the motivation for studying the information relations is to
reduce a primitive relation to one of smaller dimension which still serves
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for the generation of optimal decision rules. The generic sets Zi which
comprise any relation will be aggregations of the primitive information
sets Ii. (t). The remainder of this section establishes the algebraic
structure of information relations.
B. Homomorphisms.
The global conditional state sets have a lattice structure superimposed
on them by the set containment relation. Information relations have a
similar structure which, while not a lattice, is (almost) a partial order.
Definition: A homomorphism ~ from R, defined from Z1 and Z2 to 2 , to R'
2X
defined from Zl, Z2 to 2 , is a pair of functions4 = (¢t,2)
~I:Z ~ Z11 1(4.9)
2: 2 Z
satisfying
R(z 1,z 2) R' ( 1(Zl)'2(2) ) Z 2z Z2
(4.10)
R(Z1,Z2 ) C R' ((Zl) '2(z2) ) 1 Z
In the tableau representation, a homomorphism from R to R' is an association
of the rows and columns of R to those of R' such that the state set in
each cell of R is contained in the state set of the corresponding cell in
the image.
Definition: An information relation R is contained in another R' (RC R')
if there is a homomorphism from R to R'.
This containment relation is a generalization of set containment
When Z = Z2 {}, and R(zi,z ) is at most a singleton, this is exactly2 2 and R(zl2) s t most a sinleton, this is eactly
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set containment where Z1 and Z' index elements of subsets of X, (e.g.
figure 5a). When R(zl,z2) may be any set, this defines containment between
two classes of subsets of X (figure 5b); note that one class may be
contained in another although the second has fewer elements. Containment
between information relations may be neither antisymmetric nor related to
the size of the Z. and Z! (figure 5c).
1 1
The containment relation is clearly reflexive (if .i is the identity map)
and transitive (through composition of ~i s). It thus imposes a structure
on the set of information relations which is a partial order on equivalence
classes, where:
Definition: R is equivalent to R' (RSR')
if R CR' and R m R' .
Both the partial order and equivalence relation have useful interpretations
in the decentralized problem.
C. Automorphisms
This section focusses on the equivalence Son information relations.
Definition: An automorphism ~ on an information relation R is a homomorphism
from R to R. If both 1 and ~2 are 1:1, then it is an
isomorphism. Otherwise, it is a reducing automorphism.
Q
Clearly isomorphisms on an information relation correspond to permuting
rows and columns of a tableau, and are of little conceptual interest. There
are automorphisms which are not isomorphisms, and these are of considerable
interest.
Definition: An information relation R is irreducible if all automorphisms
on R are isomorphisms. Otherwise it is reducible.
0
-19a-
1 131 51 ! 23157
a) Set containment
.I{1,3}{1,,4}!{(2,3}1 C- {1,2,3} {1,3,4}i
b) Class containment
4131 c 12 
!, 21 - r3 4 314 3
t IS C, _
12D
c) Information relation containment
Figure 5. Containment Examples
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As the terminology suggests, a reducing automorphism will be used
to simplify, in some appropriate sense, an information relation. Provided
we can show that using the simplified information relation in decision rule
design yields results no worse than the original, then there will exist a
mechanism for generating sufficient statistics which are simpler than the
I. (t). The reducing automorphism provides this mechamism.
Definition: The reduction of an information relation R : Z1 x Z2 + ZX
by a reducing automorphism V = (41,2) is an information
relation R' : (Z 1) x (Z2) 2X where
R' (4(z1 ), 1 2 (z2 )) = R( l1 (z1 ),  2(z2 )) (4.11)
For example, figure 6a shows successive reductions of the primitive
information relation at time 3 for the system in figure 3a (as was derived
in figure 4) by the reducing automorphisms indicated by arrows. The result
is an irreducible relation. In this case, the irreducible relation can
be constructed by a sequence of automorphisms which only reduce Z1 or Z2
alone. One might conjecture that this is always the case, but figure
6b shows how the primitive information relation for system 3b requires a
joint reduction of both Z1 and Z2 at the second step in order to produce
an irreducible relation.
However, the fact that every information relation can be reduced to
an irreducible one by suitable compositions of reducing automorphisms
(thus by some single reducing automorphism) is important.
D. The Core
This construct is the most essential part of this work.
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4
1314 3
4/144
a) Example: R(2) of system 3a
21 3211
33!313C 331~ 2 
414
b) Example: R(3) of system 3b
Figure 6: Reducing Information Relations
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Definition: A core of an information relation R,denoted core (R) or R*,iS
an irreducible information relation obtained from R by some
automorphism. D
The core has a number of interesting properties. The most basic rely
on the following lemma.
Lemma 4: If two irreducible information relations R and R' are equivalent
under 5, then they are equal .
Proof: If R R', then there is a homomorphism 4 from R to R', and
another, V', from R' to R.
Consider the composed homomorphism 4 from R to R:
fl(zl)= c ( z1( 1)) (4.12)
42(z2) = 2(z2(z2 ))
That c is indeed a homomorphism from R to R is shown by
R(z'z 2) C R' ( z 1) 2(z 2)) V z2 e Z2 (4.13)
since 4 is a homomorphism from R to R', and in turn
R' (l(Zl),(2(z2)) C R(l(l (zl), 2(v2(2))) V z e Z2
(4.14)
by 4' being a homomorphism. Thus ~ is an automorphism on R, and in
fact must be an isomorphism since R is irreducible. However, the
composition of 4 and 4' can be an isomorphism if and only if 4 and 4'
are isomorphisms; hence R and R' are equal.
Up to isomorphism. This qualifier will be left implicit in the
sequel.
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This lemma immediately gives:
Theorem 1: The core of an information relation is unique. Moreover, if
RS R', then core (R) = core (R').
Proof: Any core (R)Us R, since a homomorphism from R to a core (R)
exists by definition, and a homomorphism from core (R) to R exists
by construction: core (R) is a (perhaps relabeled) restriction
of R to subsets of Z1 and Z2; construct the homomorphism from
elements of these subsets back into their original values in Z1 and Z2.
If two cores, core (R) and core'(R) exist, then
core (R)S R5core'(R) (4.15)
Both are irreducible; by transitivity of < and lemma 4 they must
be equal, hence unique.
Moreover,
core (R) S R R'I core (R') (4.16)
similarly implies core (R) = core (R').
Thus all information relations in an equivalence class of S share the
same core. Restricted to irreducible information relations, the containment
relation C is antisymmetric (R C R' and R_ 2R' qE R = R'), transitive, and
reflexive, thus inducing a partial order on the irreducible information
patterns. These are the two important structural properties of information
relations for any time t.
E. Dynamics
Section A informally showed how primitive information relations for
the same autonomous system at different times related to one another.
Section D derived a way to reduce primitive relations to their core, thereby
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creating simpler relations. This section formalizes the process by which
any relation, primitive or reduced, can be extended over time and presents
the basic property inherent in that process.
At any point in time Z. i(t) in R(t) will represent a reduced, perhaps
t
trivially, version of Y- There is a natural way to extend this aggreqation
to its counterpart at time t+l.
Definition: The expansion of an information relation R(t) to another
relation R(t+l) is denoted
R(t+l) = F(R(t)) (4.17)
and is constructed by setting
Zi. (t+l) = Z. i(t) x Yi (4.18)
and
R(t+l)[ z (t+l), z2 (t+l)]
= R(t+l) [(zl(t) y1), (z2(t) Y2)] (4.19)
_ f (R(t)[zl (t),z2(t)]) n hl (y1 h2) °lh2 y2 0
The structure of this expansion is captured in
Lemma 5: If R(t) is the primitive relation at time t, then F(R(t)) is
the primitive relation for time t+l.
0
Proof: By definition, R(t) : Y1 x Y2 , and R(t)(yl,) = x(t),
the global conditional state set based on (Yl, Y2). Identifying
Yi in (4.19) with the observation yi (t+l), yields
t+l t+l ^ 1 --R(t+l) (y f(x(t)) fn h2 (y(t+l))1 2 - n 1 (y1 (t+ _ -2
= x(t+l) (4.20)
by (4.2). Thus R(t+l) is a primitive information relation.
0
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In general, the expansion process augments the Z i(t) with yi(t+l)
and computes the conditional state set for zi (t), z2(t), Yl(t), and Y2(t)
based on the system dynamics f and the representation in R(t) of a
conditional state set for zl(t) and z2(t). Section B introduced containment
between information relations to convey the notion that one was related
to a substructure of another. Expansion preserves containment.
Lemma 6: If R CR', then
F(R) C. F(R') (4.21)
Proof: Since R<CR', there exist functions 4i: Zi + Zi satisfying
+ *
(4.10). Construct functions fi: Zi x Yi j Zi x Yi
where
+i(zi'Yi) = (i(zi)'i) (4.22)
Then for all z2 and Y2,
F(R(( Y 1) ,y (2',y 2)))
= f(R(z' ,z n -l (y_)n -h1 (y) (4.23)
= f(R' ( 1) (Zl) 2(Z2))))h-1 (y- ) 1 -1 ( ) (4.24)
by (4.10) and set inequalities, and this
= F(R') (~(z 1,yl), 2 2 (z 2 (4.25)
This establishes the first half of (4.10) for c+ ; the other half
is shown bv a symmetric argument. Thus_$+ is a homomorphism from
F(R) to F(R'); hence F(R) C F(R').
This sets up the second major result:
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Theorem 2: Let R(t) and R(t+l) be primitive information relations at
successive times. Then
core(R(t+l)) = core(F(core(R(t))) (4.26)
Proof: By Lemma 5,
R(t+l) = F(R(t)) (4.27)
From Theorem 1
core (R(t)) ; R(t) (4.28)
Hence applying Lemma 6 to each containment in .
F(core(R(t))) Ail F(R(t)) (4.29)
Then by Theorem 1 and (4.27)
core (F(core(R(t)))) = core (R(t+l)) (4.30)
Thus the cores of the primitive information relations can be computed
recursively, rather than just directly. This is the analog of the fact
that conditional state probability distributions for Markov processes may
be computed recursively, rather than requiring reference to I(t) at each
time, and has the same structural implications. The size of the primitive
information relations R(t) generally increases exponentially with t,
since Z. = Y . However, the cores of the primitive information relations,
1 1
R* (t), may remain much more manageable in size.
Figure 7 shows the recursive computation of the core information
relations for the example of figure 3b. F denotes expansion; * denotes
reduction to an irreducible relation. First, notice that the reduction of
R(2) led to an expansion of R*(2) which was a bit simpler than the primitive
R(3) displayed in figure 6, so reductions are indeed cumulative over time.
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More importantly, notice that R*(3) = R*(2) (isomorphically), and thus
the core information relation for this system is fixed for all future time
at a finite size!
Definition: The steady state core information relation R*, if it
exists, is the core of some primitive information relation
R(t) and satisfies
R* = core(F(R*)) (4.31)
If a steady state core can be found for a system, then a great deal
of the work required to solve the system is complete. However, not all
systems have a steady state core; the system in figure 3c generates cores
of the form shown in figure 8. (In fact, these are identical to the
primitive information relations). While an irreducible information relation
can be found for this system which satisfies (4.31), and which contains
(but is not contained in) R*(t) for all time, it is not yet clear what the
relation to the notion of a core for an infinite horizon problem is.
This question is revisited in Appendix A.
A final property of the core dynamics R (t+l) = core (F(R*(t)) is
illustrated by the system of figure 3d. R*(2) is shown in figure 9;
notice that it separates into two pieces: the solitary 2 state shares
no rows or column with any other entry. What is the physical reason for
this?
The solitary 2 is generated by a transition from 4 to 2. This is
an unusual transition in that both agents observe it unambigously - for
agent 1, it is the only transition from row 2 to row 1; for agent 2 it is
the only transition within: column 2. Thus its occurrence leads each agent
to know exactly what happened, and that the other agent knows exactly what
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happened, etc. This is an event which is simultaneously and unambigously
observable to both agents, and thus decouples it from any other events
and second guessing logic.
Definition: An information relation R splits if the sets Z. can be1
partitioned into nonempty disjointsubsets Zi., Z with
I II I!
R(zl, 22 = V Z1 e Zl' V Z2e Z2
(4.32)
II II !
R(zl 1 Z2) = 0 V e Z1 , V Z2 e Z2
If a relation splits, then the expansion of each part of the relation
can be computed separately (i.e. if R splits, then F(R) splits in the
compatible way). In the context of core dynamics, this means that the
two pieces evolve separately. This suggests a representation for the
core dynamics as shown in figure 9b - R*(1) expands and splits into two
parts - one of which reduces back to R*(1), the other of which evolves
separately. In this case, however, the steady state core is still that
illustrated in figure 9a.
F. Local Observers
Thus far, attention has centered on off-line calculations - the reduction
of primitive information relations to core relations, and the core dynamics.
The ostensible purpose of this is to aid the design of on-line decision
rules. The connection between the two is the dynamics of the elements of
Zi. (t) which are implied by the core dynamics.
The core dynamics alternately expand Zi(t) by appending Y.,
a new observation, and then reduce it via an equivalence relation
implied by an automorphism i'. This equivalence relation combines
-27a-
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those elements of Zi x Yi which need not be distinguished in the future as
far as the core dynamics are concerned. The entire sequence of these
equivalence relations map every observation sequence Yi into some element
of Z (t), and thus dictate the structure of a finite state machine with Yi
as an input set and Z i(t) as the states.
Definition: The local core observer for agent i is the system with
state set Zi. (t) and dynamics
zi(t+l) = fi(z i ( t ) Yi(t+l))
(4.33)
A
9i(z (t), Yi(t+l))
where the zi(t) are the components on which R (t) is defined, and ci is a
* *
component of the reducing automorphism used to reduce F(R (t)) to R (t+l).
For example, consider the system of figure 10a. Its steady state
core is shown in figure 10b, with elements of Z] and Z2 labeled arbitrarily.
Figure 10c shows the expansion F(R*), with 91 and 92 as required to
reduce it back to R*. Figure 10d is the resulting structure for the local
observer of agent 1 - agent 2 has an isomorphic structure by the symmetry
of the problem. Arcs are labeled with the values of Y1 causing transitions
in the observer; no arc labeled 1 leaves Zll as this represents a case where
agent 1 knows x(t) = 2, and 2 is followed only by 4 which gives the
observation 2.
The dynamics of these observers are intertwined despite the fact that
they operate on the basis of different observations. This fact shows
up in the information relation on which they are based. R*(zlz 2) is
the subset of states which the system may occupy when each agent i's
observer is in state zi When R*(zl,z2) = 0 , it is impossible that
zi and z2 be occupied simultaneously - thus the observers are at least
Z1 1Z2 2 Z2 3 Z2 4
zi Zl
Z13 1Z12 a4
3>b @ ~Z14 4 _
a) System b) Steady state core
z 21 Z22 z 2 3 z241 2 1 21 2 t 2
zii 2 4
,1 2
2 2 2 41
zt 2 43
1 2
z4 2 43 
c) Expansion and reduction
d ) Ae 1 ob13e
1 I 1
d) Agent I observer
Figure 10: Local Steady State Core Observers
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partially synchronized.
Other insight as to the meaning of the local observer states can be
gained from noting that R*(zl,Z 2) is the complete set of states which the
system may occupy if agent l's observer is in state z1. It is the union
of the sets of states which the system could occupy given each Yl which
leads to z . Thus the state sets corresponding to each z1 are related
to the local conditional state sets defined in (4.3). However, the
relation is rather subtle, as both z1 2 and z1 4 indicate that x ef3,4} ;
they must remain distinct due to the existence of agent 2 with different
information.
Thus the core dynamics define some automata for processing local
observations in a way which maintains the relationships described in R*.
G. Special Cases
There are certain nondeterministic systems which have more structure
than the general case discussed thus far. For example, a system yields
the equivalent of centralized information if Yl(t) = Y 2(t) at all times.
This special case appears in R(t) in that it is diagonal.
t t
if Y f Y1 2
t t
R(t) (y1 ,y2)
x(t) else (4.34)
The local core observers, in this case, are perfectly synchronized and
each implements a reduced order realization of the conditional state set
computation (4.2). The realization is reduced order as any reachable
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conditional state set which is contained in another is treated as equivalent
to that other. Thus only the maximal (in the sense of set containment)
reachable conditional state sets are tracked.
A slightly more general case is where:
Definition: The observations of agent 1 are included in those of agent 2
if Yl(t) = h21(Y2(t)), for some h2 1 D
Thus if y2 (t) is a vector, Yl(t) may be one component of that vector.
In this case, the information relations have the property that for any z2,
there is exactly one zl for which R(zl,z 2) 3 0. This is true for the primitive
t t
information relations since z2 = Y2 uniquely determines the Y1 that will
arise- This property is preserved when R(t) is reduced by any automorphism;
proof of this fact is deferred. Figure 11 illustrates such an information
relation.
In this case, the local core observer for agent 1 turns out to just
be a reduced order realization of the local conditional state set computation.
The local core observer for agent 2 is a reduced order realization of the
conditional state set for the combined system and local core observer for
agent 1. This is the structure demonstrated in the example in [15].
A final special case has one agent, say 1, operating open loop-
without observations. In this case, set
yl(t) = 0 = h1 2(y2(t))
to see that it is a variation of the above case. However, now Z1 always
has exactly one element; zl(t) indicates the steady state conditional
state set (generally X unless part of the state space is not reachable),
and z2(t) realizes a reduced order computation of x(t),
2
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H. Summary
This section has developed the notion of an information relation, and
some of the properties thereof. The properties all stem from the definition
of information relation containment via homormorphisms (4.10). The basic
premise, as yet unjustified, has been that this definition is useful in
providing the structure needed to solve decentralized nondeterministic
decision problems. The structure resulting from this definition, particularly
the core, is now known; the next section shows what it can do in a subset
of the problems of interest.
V. DECENTRALIZED ESTIMATION
This section continues the assumption of the previous one that the
system dynamics are autonomous, but introduces the objective function in
order to derive decision rules. Since the cost function J compares agents'
decisions with the true state, these will be referred to as decentralized
estimation problems. They can be solved by (a) reducing them to a sequence
of static problems of the type addressed in section III, (b) relating the
static problems to the information relation and its structure, and
(c) combining the resulting decision rules with the observer dynamics
necessary to compute sufficient statistics on-line. Some special cases will
be of particular interest.
A. Reduction to Static Problems
The general decentralized estimation problem is to find the
min max max J(x(t),ul(t),u 2(t)) (5.1)
T T tEtl,...,T} x(t)possible
1 2
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where x(t) is possible if x(t) e f t(x ), (the t-fold composition of f with
itself). The information restriction
ui(t) = Yi(t) (yt) (5.2)
still applies.
Define
J (t),Y(t)) max J(X(t),Y 2 (t )) (5.3)
Yt possible
Y2J
so (5.1) becomes
min max J ( (t) ' (t))
T T t
1' 1 (5.4)
= max min J(l(t),'Y2(t))
t yl(t)
Y2(t)
Since decisions do not affect dynamics or costs other than that a
single time; J depends only on decision rules at one time. Thus
Lemma 7: The solution to the decentralized estimation problem may be
found by solving the sequence:
minimize J (Y1 (t)Y2(t)) (5.5)
Y1 (t), 2 (t)
Proof: (5.4)
B. Use of the Information Relation
The important structural quantity in J is the characterization of the
set of possible triples (x(t), Yl, Y2). This is a role which the information
relation can play.
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Definition: The optimal value of an information relation R in a non-
deterministic decentralized estimation problem, denoted J* (R),
is
min max J(xY 1(Z1 ),Y2 (Z2))
YlY2 Zlez 1
(5.6)
z2eZ2
xeR(Zl'Z2 )
with Z1 and Z2 the sets on which R is defined, and the restriction
Yi: Z. . U. (5.7)
0
Thus if R is a primitive information relation, J*(R) is the optimal
value of (5.5), since Z. = Yt and R specifies the set of x(t) possible
t t
(perhaps empty) for each (Yl' Y2). Naturally we are interested in simpler
information relations; the following lemma establishes the connection between
information relations and their optimal values.
Lemma 8: If R and R' are information relations, then
R C R'i J*(R) < J*(R') (5.8)
Proof: If RC R' , then a homomorphism 2 = (c1',2) exists from R to R'.
Consider any strategy Y' = (YI, y2) with
Yi : Zi 4 U (5.9)1 1
Build a strateqv Y = (Y1,Y2) with
Yi.(z.) = Y(i(zi)) (5.10)1 1 1 1 1
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Then
max J(x, Y1 (Z1 )' Y2(z2 )) (5.11)
z1
z2
xeR(zl,z 2)
= max J(x,Y 1(41(Z1))' Y2(2(2))
)
z1
z2
xe R(ZlZ 2 )
11< max JJ(x,y l (z y (z (5.12)
2
xE R'(z',z.)
where the inequality stems from the fact that
c.(Z ) C Z{ (5.13)
R(zl,Z 2) C R'( 1 (z1 )', 2 (z2 ))
from the definition of a homomorphism. Since (5.12) holds for all y',
evaluate it at a y' which aehieves J? (R'). The_corresponding y defined
in (5.10), must achieve a value of (5.11) no largqer than J*(R'),
and the best y is at least as good as this one, so the conclusion holds.
This immediately suggests the third major result:
Theorem 3: Let R(t) be a primitive information relation and R*(t) its core.
Then
J*(R(t)) = J*(R*(t)) (5.14)
Proof: From theorem 1, R(t)US R* (t). Applying Lemma 8 in both directions,
the conclusion follows. O
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This theorem implies that the pair of decision rules y1, Y2 which
achieve the optimum value of (5.6) when R is a primitive relation perform
exactly as well as the rules optimizing (5.6) for tne core of that relation.
Since the former are functions on Y., they are more cumbersome than the
latter, which are functions of only the Zi of the core. Since each agent
can compute the value of z. i(t) representing the situation given an observation
sequence Yi by using its local core observer, the solution to (5.6)
with R*(t) can be implemented on line. Thus the complexity of the problem
can be significantly reduced from that of (.5.5).
C. General Solution
The procedure for solving the nondeterministic optimal decentralized
estimation problem is thus:
1. Compute the core dynamics (4.18 - 4.19, 4.11)
R*Ct+l) = core (F(R*(t)))
(5.15)
R*(O) = R({zl}, {z}) = x (5.15)
2. Derive from these the local core observers (4.33)
z.i(t+l) = fi(zi(t), Yi(t+l)) (5.16)
3. Find the core decision rules Y i : Zi - U. minimizing
max J(x 1 Y1(Zl), y2(z2)) (5.17)
z1
z2
xe R*(t)(zlZ 2)
4. Implement the local core observers and decision rules
ul(t) = Y(z.(t)) = (5.18)1 11 C
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Thus a recursive solution can be found based on the structure of
the core information relation. The solution of (5.17) can be obtained
as described in section III by exploiting the PBPO necessary conditions
* *
and finding the best pair (Y1, Y2) which satisfy them. If a steady state
core exists, then the dynamics of the local core observers, and the structure
of the decision rules, become stationary.
Figure 12 illustrates the resulting solution structure. Note the
decomposition of each agent's processing into an estimator with memory preceed-
ing a memoryless decision rule. The estimators may be designed independently
of the cost function J, but must be derived jointly. Similarly, the decision
rules are derived jointly, but only in response to those dynamics retained
in the core.
D. Special Cases
Three special cases of information relations were identified in the
last section. Their impact on the estimation rules is summarized here.
1. Splitting Cores: If R* splits, then the design of the decision
I 'I I
rules for each piece can be done separately. If Z1, Z1 , Z2, and
Z2 are the partitions on Z1 and Z2 which support the split,
and R and R are the restrictions of R to the appropriate sub-
sets, then
* ** *
J (R) = max {J(R ), J (R )} (5.19)
and the optimization over R decomposes.
2. Centralized information: When yl(t) = y2(t), R becomes diagonal
t t t t
as R(y, Y2) = unless Y1 = Y2. This is an extreme case of
spliting as the value of the decision rule for each case of
zl = z2 can be derived separately.
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Figure 12. Optimal Decentralized Estimation Structure
-37-
3. Included information: When Yl(t) = h1 2(y2(t)), so agent 2 knows
agent l's information exactly, then R* has a structure where,
for every z2, there is exactly one zl for which R*(ZlZ 2)1 I.
Again this is a case of splitting; decision rules can be found via:
a) For each zl and ul, find
y2(z21zl,u1 ) = argmin max J(x,u ,U2 (5.20)
x2 e R(zl1Z 2)
and define the value of this minimum as V2(zl,U1)
b) For each z!, set
(1
U1
c) Set
y *(z)Y(z zly 1 (z9) (5.22)¥2(2) =2 2 2zl'Yl(Zl) 
This is possible because each z2 determines the z1 required
in (5.22) uniquely.
This is a recursive procedure taking advantage of the nesting of the
information of agent 1 with that of agent 2. Interpreted as a Stackelberg
solution to a team problem, this implies that agent 1, with the reduced
information, is a leader and agent 2, with more information, is a follower.
This rather curious connection between Stackelberg solutions and included
observations arises naturally
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VI. THE CONTROL PROBLEM
This section finally relates the information relation and its properties
to the full control problem defined in section II. Additional complexity
is generated by the fact that information relations can only be expanded
in the context of specific decision rules. This sets up some deterministic
(unless splitting occurs) core dynamics which are controlled by selections
of decision rules. Viewing cores as states and decision rules as inputs,
a dynamic programming approach leads to the complete solution.
A. Information Dynamics
The definitions of information relation, homomorphisms, automorphisms,
containment, and cores established in section IV carry over to the control
problem without change. The expansion process is the only place where new
information relations are generated, so the influence of decisions on
dynamics requires a modification there.
Definition: The expansion of an information relation R by decision
rules yi : Z. U. is an information relation R', where
1 1
R' = F(R, Y1' Y2 ) (6.1)
R' : Z1 x Z2 + 2 (6.2)
Z. Z. x Y. (6.3)
R ((zl'Y1 ),(z 2,Y2 )) = f(R(zl,Z2) ,Y1(z1) Y 2 (z2))
n h11 (Y1) h 21 (y2) (6.4)
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This is interpreted as follows. If R is information relation at a
system at time t, then F(R,y1 ,y2 ) is information relation between two agents
observing the system via Y1 and Y2 while it autonomously evolves for one time
space step under the decisions generated by y1 and y2. (6.4) is the update
for the conditional state set given R(zl,z2) as the prior conditional state
set, decisions generated by y1 and Y2 and new observations y and Y2.
Thus R will describe the information relation between the agents if y1
and y2 are implemented as decision rules.
Only one new concept is needed.
Definition: Let ~ be a homomorphism from R to R . Then a decision rule
Yi : Zi - Ui is contained in Yi = Zi + Ui, denoted yi e Yi_
if
Yi(z i) = Yi(i ( zi)) V z.i e Zi (6.5)
With this notion, the results of section IV generalize to the control
case as:
Theorem 4: Let R and R be information relations, and Yi, y decision
rules of the appropriate structure.
a) If R is a primitive information relation, then so is
F(R, y1' y2)
b) If R R , Yl Y 1, and y2 CY 2, all by the same
homomorphism, then
.Y2' I
-40-
c) If R is a primitive information relation, then
core(F(R,y1,Y2 ))= core(F(core(R) ,Y1 Y2)) (6.7)
Proofs: All proofs are direct extensions of
a) Lemma 5
b) Lemma 6
c) Theorem 2, using (a) and (b).
As in the autonomous case, (c) is the critical fact. The core information
relations can be viewed as the state of a new process with dynamics (6.7)
and control (Y1',2). (If (6.7) produces a new core which splits, then the
dynamics must be viewed as nondeterministic, as different sample paths in
the original process may lie in either of the two pieces). These dynamics
establish half of a new problem structure,
B. Costs
The other half involves the objective. Properties developed in Section V
for the estimation problem also generalize to the control problem.
Definition: The cost of-an information relation R with compatible decision
rules y1', 2 is
J(R,Y1,'2) = max J(x,y1(z1), Y2(z2 )) (6.8)
z1
z2
xe R(Zl,Z 2) 1O
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The overall problem objective (2.13) can be written as
J(rl r) max max J(x(t),y 1 (Y),y (yt))
te{l,...,T} x(t) 2
yt t possible
Y2
Given Yl and y2 t the only x(t)'s possible are given by R(t)(yt,yt), the
primitive information relation for time t. constructed recursively
from (6.4) (Theorem 4a guarantees such an R(t) is primitive). (6.9) then
becomes
12 te{l,.. ,T} t
1 (6.10)
t
t t
xe R(yl,y2)
= max J(R(t), y1(t), y2(t)) (6.11)
te {1,...,T}
where the dependence of R(t) on prior decision rules is left implicit.
Thus the overall objective can be written in terms of costs of primitive
relations with decision rules.
The final result needed is:
Theorem 5: Let R and R be information relations, with y1, y2 and Y1, Y2
compatible decision rules. Then
a) If RC R , 1 , and Y2 by the same homomorphism c,
then
J(R, Y1, Y2 ) < J(R , Y 1, Y2) (6.12)
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b) If R = core (R ), y1 y1 , and y 2 by the same
homomorphism ~, then
J(R,Y1, y2) = J(R , Y1 Y2) (6.13)
Proof: Also direct extensions of previous results.
a) Lemma 8
b) (a) with theorem 1.
Applying (6.13) to (6.11), the objective becomes
! I
J( 1, r2) = max J(core(R(t)),yl(t), Y2 (t)) (6.14)2 ~te{l,... ,T}
! I
where y and y2 are the restrictions of y and to core (R(t)):
C. General Solution
Let R*(t) = core (R(t)), where R(t) is the primitive information relation
created by decision rules prior to time t. From theorem 4c,
R*(t+l) = core (F(R*(t), Y1 (t), y2(t))) (6.15)
A
= F*(R*(t), Yl(t), Y2(t))
and the overall objective is
J(rl, r) = max J(R*(t), Yl(t), y2(t)) (6.16)
te{l,...,T)
where rl and r2 are now sequences of decision rules whose arguments are in
Zl(t) and Z2 (t), respectively. Solution of this problem would involve
straightforward minimax dynamic programming if the set in which the R*(t)
could lie were determinable ahead of time. Unfortunately, it is not known
how to do this at this point; however, one may construct the set of all cores
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reachable under all rl, r2 from R*(O) and take this to be the requisite set.
This generates the following procedure for solving the decentralized
optimal control problem for finite nondeterministic automata:
1. Using (6.15) for all possible Yi : Zi(t) -+ Ui , construct
the set JR of reachable cores.
2. Dynamic program:
a) Set
V(R,T) = min J(R, y1 , Y2) (6.17)
Y1l' Y2
for each R @ R .
b) Given V(R,t+l) for every R e IR, compute
V(R,t) = min max{ J(R, y, y2)
1'Y2 (6.18)
V(F*(R, Y1, Y 2 ), t+l))
(if F*(R, Y 1 , Y2 ) splits, include all pieces separately in (6.18)).
c) After the recursion (b) ends, determine the actual cores R*(t)
* *
and optimal decision rules Yl(t), 2 (t) reached from R*(O) ,
* *
using (6.15) and deriving y1, y2 as the arguments achieving
a minimum in (6.18)
3. Implement:
a) Construct the local observers from the dynamics of Zl(t)
and Z2(t) along the optimal trajectory of cores,
* *
b) Implement yl(t) and Y2(t) as memoryless feedback maps from
Zl(t) and Z 2(t) to decision sets.
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There are several structural points to note about this solution.
First, the implementation is of the same structure as that of figure 12,
except both decisions are now fed back into the system. Thus each agent consists
of an estimator followed by a memoryless decision rule. As before, the
local estimators must be designed jointly; however, their structure is
highly dependent on the decision rules of both agents. There is no
separation principle in this class of decentralized control problems:
the structure of the estimator for agent 1 depends on the decision rules
which agent 2 uses, as knowledge of these impacts on how agent one "second
guesses" the activities of agent 2 and their impact on the system. Finally,
the least well understood step is step 1 - for many problems IR may be
reasonably small; however, problems for which one set of strategies
generates dynamics such as those of figure 3c, increasing over time
without limit, may yield unmanageably large sets of JR after a few steps.
The importance of this issue is thus highly dependent upon the problem.
As a final note,it is easy to verify by induction that: If R C R',
then
V(R,t) < V(R',t) Vt e {1,.. . ,T}
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Having achieved the solution of the general control problem, several
lessons can be learned from this exercise.
A. Summary
The three basic constructs introduced were the information relation,
the notation of containment of one relation in another, and the process
of reducing one into another. These are the decentralized generalizations
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of the constructs required for a centralized treatment of this problem:
sets, set containment, and the elimination of redundant elements in set
unions (in the computation of the conditional state set). The dynamics
of the information relation were derived. The facts that the containment
relation is preserved by these dynamics, and that it leads to a compatible
inequality on the cost of an information relation, are what establish the
role of irreducible information relations (the core) in the problem.
Reformulation of the control problem in terms of the core yields a
standard dynamic programming problem.
The core exists as a simple description of one agent's information
set to both the system state and to other agents' information. The fact
that it is simpler than the primitive information relation is strongly
dependent upon the nondeterministic system model and the minimax cost
objective. This is most evident in the decentralized estimation case.
At each point, the static problem which each agent must solve is originally
posed in terms of a primitive information relation, then simplified to
one on the core. Consider the relation of figure 13. Z2 1 can be mapped onto
Zll by a reducing automorphism. This implies that we may set
Y1(Z21) = 1(Zll1 ) without loss of optimality. Let Y2 be any decision rule
on {z21,z22} . The above equality assures that the event (x=l,zll,z21)
will be penalized identically as would (x=l,z1 2,z2 1), and this cannot
increase the value of the worst case. However, it may well be that
min max J(x, 1 (zll ), 2 (z21)) > min max J(x,y l( 12),y2(Z 1 1))
Yl (Z)1 1 xe{l,2} Y (z 1 2 ) xeCl}
(7.1)
These two could not be treated as equal with other objective structures,
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Z2 1 Z2 2
Zi2 I
Figure 13. A Simple, Reducible Information Relation
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and thus one could not consider them equivalent and the information
relation could not be reduced.
Computationally, the information relation simplifies some problems,
often significantly. However, two difficulties remain: the core may
always grow in size without bound, and the number of possible decision rules
which may be defined on a large information relation, and which defines
the size of the control space in the reformulated problem, may be quite
large. These difficulties may be resolved through deeper understanding
of the role of the state core or through branch and bound techniques,
but these are open questions.
B. Conclusions
Whether these results may suggest important new approaches to
practical decentralized control design, or whether they exist only as
an interesting special case, is only a matter of speculation now.
However, they allow two principle conclusions to be drawn.
First, the information relation is a richer structure than a set, and
essential to this problem. Extension of these results to probabilistic
models,with which we are more familiar, will require a similar generalization
of probabilistic structures to the decentralized case. However, behind
every probability measure lies a C-algebra, so part of the work may be
done.
Second, there are some problems which can be cast in the model and
objective structure assumed here, and they can now be addressed directly.
Events which can be expected to happen sometimes, but not always, can be
modeled by nondeterministic structures which allow them to occur, say,
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at least three, but no more than five, times out of any eight sequential
time steps. By this type of remodeling, the apparent limitations of
the formulation can be partially overcome.
For example, consider the problem of designing protocols for de-
centralized management of a multiaccess channel [181]. A source of messages
may produce them no more than NM out of any NT consecutive time steps.
They may appear at any one of M transmitting sites. There they are
stored in a queue, and the agent at each site must decide whether to
attempt to transmit one message or to wait, at each time step. It has
knowledge of its queue length and past activity on the channel. Depending
on the number of agents transmitting simultaneously the channel may
be clear, busy (one attempt, successful) or jammed (several attempts,
unsuccessful). A successful attempt reduces a queue length by one. The
objective function penalizes the maximum length of the queue at any site,
at any time, over all possible message production patterns. This suggests
a relatively simple nondeterministic, finite state model with a minimax
objective - and is thus suitable for solution by the techniques given
here. Variation of the structure of the solution as NM, NT, and M
are changed would be quite interesting.
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APPENDIX A
Steady State Cores: Nonexistance
This appendix demonstrates a system which does not have a steady
state core for a decentralized estimation problem. The dynamics and
observation structure are those of figure 3c, so the primitive information
relations are themselves irreducible (figure 8). Let the decision sets be
U1 = U2 = [0,1]. Construct a cost functional
6(ul,U 2) x e{l1,2,31
J(ul'U2 ) =(A-l)
6(u, & [u2 - ]mod 1) x = 4
where 6(x,y) = 0 iff x = y, and where E is any irrational number.
First, we can construct decision rules for this problem which achieve
a worst-case cost of 0. Clearly no rules exist which give better worst-case
performance. Consider any information relation of the form illustrated in
Figure 8, say ?R(3). If zl is the local observer state of agent 1
corresponding to the uppermost row, set l1(Zl) = a e[0,1] arbitrarily.
Now proceed recursively: assume some cell has one decision rule corresponding
to it already defined (i.e. for the cell at (ZlZ 2), either Yl(zl) or
y2(z2) is specified). Construct the other by setting
(A-2)
[2 (z2) - ] -if R( Z2 ) =2 4
mod 1
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if Y2(Z2) is defined, and
(z1) if R(zlz 2 ) e {1,2,311 (Z1 if R~zl '2
(A-3)
Y2( 2) =
[Y1 (Z1) + £] if R(zl,z2) = 4
mod 1
if it is Y1 (z1 ) that is defined. This introduces a new cell with only one
component defined, or terminates the recursion. Note that aside from the choice
of a, these decision rules are unique in achieving J 0 O. Note also
that the values of the decision rules are of the general form
Yi(zi) = [a ± n £] n integer (A4)
1 1 (A-4)
mod 1
Now assume that a reducing homomorphism ~ exists for an information
relation of this type which produces a (strictly simplified) core. Then
l I
there must be a pair (zi,zi) such that zi $ zi = .i(zi); otherwise
would be an isomorphism. By theorem 3, the value of R(3) must equal that
of its reduction. From above, that value is zero. Also from above, the
decision rules which achieve that value must be of the form
Yi(z ) = [a±+n. ]
li mod 1
(A-5)
l l
Yi(z.) = [a± +n i ]
mod 1
Moreover, since zi ~ zi, the recursive procedure for generating these rules
must have at least one step of the form
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j(-) = [y.(-) + ] (A-6)
mod 1
I I
between the derivation of Yi(zi) and Yi(zi). Thus ni # ni. From the
proof of Lemma 8, we must be able to set
Yi(zi) =Yi(zi) (A-7)
and preserve optimality. This occurs iff
[(n. - n.)] = 0 (A-8)
1 1
mod 1
i.e. iff the quantity in brackets is an integer. Since E may be irrational,
we have a contradiction. All primitive information relations for the
system of Figure 3c must be irreducible; hence the core of the system is-
unbounded in size; hence no finite steady state core exists.
